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THE ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP AN
APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF LIABILITY
FOR THE DEFAMATION OF PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE PEOPLE:
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
FEDERALIZATION OF LIBEL LAW
by HOWARD A. GUTMAN

INTRODUCTION

The area of public libel' has rapidly evolved since the Supreme Court's historic entrance into the field in 1964, in the case of New York imes Co. v.
Sullivan.2 The Supreme Court has imposed federal standards of liability regarding the defamation of public officials, public figures, and private people,
in an attempt to prudently balance the public's "right to know" with the
individual's interest in his good name. In this article, I shall examine the interests involved in public libel, the state of the law before the Court's entrance into
it, and most importantly, the constitutional standards of liability which have
emerged from recent Supreme Court decisions balancing the interests in the
area. Special attention will be paid to the current standard of liability, the Gertz
standard, and what I consider to be its defects. I shall conclude the article with an
explication of my proposed standard of liability, which I contend, will balance
the equities more prudently than any of the standards proposed by the Court.
Public libel involves two conflicting interests: the individual's interest in his
good name, and society's interest in the widespread dissemination of information. The interest in good name is "relational," 3 since it concerns the individual's esteem within the community. Loss of esteem may mean impairment
of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, mental
anguish and suffering, alienation of associates, and financial loss. 4 At common
law, the interest in reputation was deemed so significant that a large group of
defamatory statements was actionable on its face, and damages could be
awarded without proof of actual injury.5 One justice declared that the recognition of the individual's interest in his good name, "reflects no more than our
I. In the context of this article, the term, public libel, applies to the defamation of public
officials, public figures, and private people involved in issues of public interest.
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. See Green, Relational Interest 31 ILL. L. REV. 35 (1936).
4. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
5. For descriptions of the doctrine of libel per se, see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS I11-116 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER); Justice White, dissenting, in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,369 (1973) [hereinafter cited as White]; Forbes et al Federalization
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basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of 6every human being-a
concept at the root of any system of ordered liberty."
Also involved in the area of public libel are the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press. The First Amendment provides a "right
to speak" and, more importantly, a "right to know." The "right to speak" concerns the individual's right to speak his mind. The "right to speak" concerns
7
the individual, not the body politic, talkativeness, not information. Guaranteeing a "right to speak" grants an opportunity for individual self-fulfillment and
happiness. 8 Most agree that the "right to speak" is subject to reasonable limitations. 9 Few contend that legal sanctions against "misrepresentation, obscenity,
perjury, false advertising, solicitation of crime, complicity by encouragement,
[and] conspiracy" violate First Amendment guarantees.10
Debate occurs on the subject of restrictions on the discussion of public
issues. The discussion of public issues, in contradistinction to the discussion of
private issues as those cited above, concerns society's "need to know.""
The "need to know" is the body politics's desire to acquire useful information by
which to conduct its decision-making. Most theorists agree that, in a democracy,
intelligent decisions can only be made in an environment of abundant information. To insure this type of environment, the discussion of public issues must be
protected.
The constitutional interest in promoting uninhibited discussion of public
issues conflicts with the common law interest in securing the individual a means
for vindication of his reputation. Libel law regulates speech based upon its
content; information-gathering by the people suffers from such regulation.
Discussion of public issues is not free if speakers can be punished for their errors.
In short, "(w)hatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of free
debate."12
6. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966).
7. When the speaker's words convey information useful to the body politic, the "right to know"
becomes the applicable equity. See supra notes 9 and 10.
8. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970), reprinted in Bloustein,
The First Amendment and Privacy The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L.
REV. 43 (1974), [hereinafter cited, BLOUSTEIN]; Justice Brandeis, concurring, in Whitney v.
California 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927); and Bork Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I, 25-27 (1971).
9. See generally Meikeljohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV.
245 [hereinafter cited as Meikeljohn]. See also Bloustein, supra note 8, at 44.
10. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49-50n.10 (1961).
11. Dr. Alexander Meikeljohn, an authority on the First Amendment, comments that what is
important under the Amendment is not that "everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying
(is) said." Meikeljohn, Political Freedom 26 (1960), reprinted in BLOUSTEIN, supra note 8, at 44.
12. Sweeny v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cited in Public OfJicial and Actual
Malice Standards: The Evolution of New York imes Co. v. Sullivan, 56 IowA L. REV. 393 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Standards]. Some authors have contended that there are remedies for damage
to reputation which not only reinstate the individual's good name, but also contribute to the public
discussion. These remedies include retraction, apology, and right of reply statutes, and the
establishment of a public fund to pay for damages. Spacial limitations prohibit the discussion of
these and other remedies in this article, though the subject of alternatives to the traditional libel
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To complicate this conflict, there is the contention that, "defamed's litigative response is part of the free flow of information and should be encouraged
rather than discouraged."' 3 That is, the libel action serves the public's "right
to know" by correcting misguided impressions of the individual's reputation,
especially important if the defamed individual is a public person. The public's
perception of the pertinent issue may also be changed by the libel judgment.
Finally, the threat of a libel judgment encourages publishers to be responsible
and verify their stories before publishing them. So, society's interest in abundant
information conflicts not only with the individual's interest in his good name,
but also with society's interest in accurate information.
In summary, the different equities present in defamation law conflict with
one another. Society's interest in abundant information conflicts with its
interest in accurate information and the public's "right to know" is in opposition to the individual's interest in his good name. Before examining how the
Supreme Court balanced these equities, it is at first useful to analyze the state of
the law before the Court's entrance into the field.
I. Public Libel before New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
Historically, libelous statements were not entitled to constitutional protection. In Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, the Court stated: it is recognized that punishment for the abuse of the liberty accorded to
the press is essential to the protection of the public, and that the common law rules that subject the libeler to responsibility for the public
offense, as well as for the private injury, are not abolished by the pro4
tection extended in our constitutions.1
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,the Court uttered its now famous declaration
that,
there are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention of which have never been thought to raise any constitutional
problem. These include the lewd, and obscene, the profane, the libelous
... It has been well-observed that such utterances are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly out5
weighed by the social interest in order and morality.'
And in Beauharis v. Illinois, the Court remarked: "Nowhere (at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution) was there any suggestion that the crime of
action is an important one. For discussion of these alternatives, see generally, Vindication of the
reputation of A Public Olficial 80 HARV. L. REV. 1730 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Vindication];
Barron, Access to the Press: A First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967); Lange, The
Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A CriticalReview and Assess-

ment, 52 N.C.L. Rev. 1 (1973); and Restatement (Second) of Torts, Special Note at 295-298 (Tent.
Draft No. 20, 1974). The Supreme Court did, however, strike down as unconstitutional a Florida
right of reply statute in Miami Herald Publishing Co., Division of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
13. Vindication, supra note 12, at 1731.
14. 283 U.S. 697, 714-15 (1931).
15. 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
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libel be abolished." 16 Dicta in a number of other cases reitterated the principle
7
that the punishment of libel does not violate First Amendment guarantees.'
Commentary on matters of public interest' 8 was, however, protected to some
degree in all jurisdictions by the "fair comment" privilege. The majority 9 of
jurisdictions extended the privilege only to expressions of opinion, not assertions of fact. 20 In these jurisdictions, false statements even about subjects of
public interest were actionable. Furthermore, in these jurisdictions, an opinion
based upon facts which were not substantially true was also actionable. 2'
In a minority of jurisdictions, defamatory misstatements of fact made with
good faith were privileged. 22 In all jurisdictions, the comment had to be "fair" in
order to be privileged. That is, it could not be made with malice but must repre23
sent the actual opinion of the critic.
There were two bases for the majority rule protecting only expressions of
opinion, and not misstatements of fact. First, it was thought that misstatements of fact were more damaging to the reputations of public people than
expressions of opinion. 24 If false attacks were privileged, good men might be
deterred from seeking office. Secondly, it was believed that while all honest
opinions have some value in the marketplace of ideas, false statements impair
16. 343 U.S. 250, 254-55 (1951).
17. See White v. Nichols, 3 How. 366 (1845); Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225 (1876); Dorr V. United
States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U.S. 165 (1913); Baker v. Warner, 231 U.S. 588
(1913); Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner, 250 U.S. 290 (1919), reprinted in White, supra note 5, at
384. See also Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907); Schenectady Union Publ Co. v.
Sweeny, 316 U.S. 642(1942); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348-49(1945); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 522n.10 (1950); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-83 (1957); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49-50n. 10 (1961); Times Film Co. v. City of Chicago,
365 U.S. 43, 48 (1961). But see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927); Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); N.A.A.C.P. v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 445 (1963). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254(1964).
18. For an explanation of which subjects were within the scope of the term public interest, see
Note, Fair Comment 62 HARV. L. REV. 1208-10 [hereinafter cited as Fair Comment], and
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §606, comment a (1938).
19. Approximately three-fourths of the states adhered to the majority position. See Berney,
Libel and the First Amendment-A New Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L. REV. 9n.40 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Berney].

20. See

PROSSER,

supra note 5, at 621-22.

21. See Fair Comment, supra note 18, at 1212.
22. For the most notable exposition of the minority position, see Coleman v. MacLennan, 78
Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908).
23. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606(I) (1938), and Berney, supra note 19, at 10n.47. The
comment or accusation does not, however, have to be one which a man of reasonable intelligence and
judgment would make, for "If the public is to be aided in forming its judgment upon matters of
public's "right to know" would also be abridged if in an investigation of a price-fixing scheme
matter how foolish or prejudiced, be privileged." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606, comment c (1938).
See H.E. Crawford Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. 241: F.2d 387 (4th Cir 1957).
24. See Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion 23 Harv. L. Rev. 419 (1910). For a critique of
that idea, see Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 Colo. L. Rev. 894-96 (1949)
[hereinafter cited as Noel].
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the public's ability to acquire accurate information about public affairs. 25
While the individual's good name was adequately protected by the majority
fair comment rule, the Supreme Court would hold in the case of New York
imes Co. v. Sullivan that the rule violated First Amendment guarantees.
II. The New York imes Case
The publication in question in the case of New York imes Co. v. Sullivan,
was an advertisment placed in the New York imes on March 29, 1960 by
supporters of the civil rights movement calling themselves 7he Committee to
Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South. The
advertisement entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices," spoke of mistreatment of
civil rights workers by the Alabama police. The advertisement stated:
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang "My Country Tis
of Thee" on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from
school, and truck-loads of police armed with shotguns and tear gas
ringed the Alabama State College Campus. When the entire student
body protested to state authorities by refusing to re-register, their
dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve them into submission ... Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr.
King's peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They have
bombed his home almost killing his wife and child. They have assaulted
his person. They have arrested him seven times for 'speeding,' 'loitering'
and similar 'offenses.' And now they have charged him with 'perjury'-a
felony under which they could imprison him for ten years.2 6
Some of the incidents were inaccurately described and some cited have never
occurred. 27 William B. Sullivan, a city commissioner for Montgomery in
charge of the police department, contended that some of the statements in the
advertisement referred to him and that the inaccuracies constituted libel.
Sullivan brought an action for libel in Alabama state court against the publisher
of the advertisement.
The fair comment privilege in Alabama, like those in the majority of jurisdictions, was limited to the expression of honest opinions based upon true
underlying facts. Defendant was precluded from resort to the privilege because
of the inaccuracies in the statements. The jury was instructed that defendant's
25. See Noel, supra note 24, at 892.
26. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 257-58 (1964).
27. I. The students sang the National Anthem, not "My Country Tis of Thee." 2. Students were
expelled for demanding service at a lunch counter in the Montgomery County Courthouse, not for
leading the demonstration. 3. Most, but not all of the students had protested the expulsion. 4.
Those students had protested by boycotting classes on a single day, not by refusing to register for the
ensuing semester. 5. The dining hall was not padlocked and the only students barred from eating
were those without proper meal tickets. 6. The police did not "ring" the campus nor were they called
to the campus in connection with the demonstration, though they were deployed near the campus
in large numbers. 7. Dr. King had been arrested four, not seven, times and it was questionable
wether Dr. King had, in fact, been arrested for loitering. See Id. at 258-59 and Kalven, The New
York Tines Case: A Note On 'The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,' 1964 SuP. CT. REV.
198.
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statements were libelous per se and unprivileged, so that plaintiff could be
awarded a judgment upon a finding that the statements were made by the
defendant and "of and concerning plaintiff." 28 The jury decided that the two
requirements had been met and awarded Sullivan a verdict for 500,000 dollars,
not divided into compensatory and punitive portions. The judgment was
affirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court reversed and decided that the majority rule
of fair comment, as applied to the defamation of public officials,violated First
Amendment guarantees. The Supreme Court announced a new constitutional
privilege for the criticism of the official conduct of public officials. The Court
decided that a public official must prove actual malice, knowledge of the
falsity of the charges or reckless disregard of whether they were false or not,
in order to be awarded a judgment for libel against the publishers of criticism
relating to his official conduct.
The basis of the decision was a generalized commitment that, "debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 30 Specifically, three reasons were given for the
new rule. First, since public officials have an immunity from libel actions, the
critics of public officials should have an analagous immunity. 31 Secondly,
though laws punishing private libel do not violate First Amendment
quarantees, laws of seditious libel do.32 Thirdly, and most importantly, to
protect speech that matters, true statements and all expressions of opinion, some
false statements must also be protected. On this point Justice Brennan speaking
for the Court stated, "That erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and
that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing
space' that they 'need . . . to survive.' "33 The Court explained what it considered to be the difficulty of the majority rule of fair comment:
Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred
from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and
even though it is in fact, true, because of doubt whether it can be proved
34
in court or fear of the expense of having to do so.
28. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1964).
29. Id. at 279-80.
30. Id. at 270.
31. See Id. at 282-83. The absolute privilege for the utterances of high-ranking governmental
officials within the "outer perimeter" of their duties was established in Barr v. DiMatteo, 360
U.S. 564 (1959). See also Spaulding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896); Becht, The Absolute Privilege
of the Executive in Defimation, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1127 (1962); Prosser, supra note 5, at 114.
32. See note 28, supra, at 272-77, and Meikeljohn, supra note 9, at 259.
33. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963), cited in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964).
34. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
35. The Court did not appear to believe in the independent value of false statements. Rather, the
Court believed in the utility of protecting falsehood in order to promote the spread of ideas and truth.
One justice in a latter case stated the rationale: "Neither lies nor false communications serve the ends
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The foundation of the Court's decision was its fear of media-self-censorship. 35
Little empirical evidence was, however, given for the idea that publishers are
36
greatly swayed by the applicable standard of liability.
Hence, critics of the decision have claimed that it denigrated the reputation of
public officials for the sake of an unproved assumption. 37 Most in the
scholarly community, however, applauded the decision. 38 Almost all agreed that
the decision had dramatically changed libel law, though the exact meaning and
significance of the changes would not be seen for a number of years. The terms
"public official," "actual malice," and "relating to his official conduct," left
undefined in the decision, would later be adequately defined in the progeny
of limes.
Il1. The Scope of the Privilege
A. Who is a "Public Official?"
In Garrison v. Louisiana,39 the Court applied the public official designation
to a group of Louisiana parish judges. In Henry v. Collins,40 the Court deemed a
public official to be a County Attorney and Chief of Police in Mississippi. In
Rosenblatt v. Baer,4' the Court determined the minimum range of the term. The
Court stated:
...the "public official" designation applies at the very least to those
among the hierarchy of governmental employees who have, or appear
to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over
42
the conduct of governmental affairs.
of the First Amendment, and no one suggests their desirability or further proliferation. But to
insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the
First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones." St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732(1968). But see, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279n. 19
(1964).
36. One author stated that, "The Times privilege has failed to prevent self-censorship because
it does little to reduce the cost of defending against libel claims." Anderson, Libel and Press
Self-Censorship 53 TEX. L. REV. 424-25 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Anderson]. See also White,
supra note 5, at 390.
37. Lewis Green asserted that, "The judgment in the New York Times Case was not proof of a
fundamental inadequacy of the law of libel; it was simply a breakdown of the judicial process in certain southern states, similar to the breakdown in the enforcement of the criminal law in these same
states ... In short, I suggest that the new rule eradicates a very valuable element in our society, and
adds little in return. Green, The New York Times Rule; Judicial Overkill, 12 VILL. L. REV. 732,
(1967).
38. See Berney, supra note 19, at 58; Pedrick, Freedom Of The Press And The Law of Libel: The
Modern Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L. Q. 581, 608 (1964); Comment, The New Constitutional
Definition of Libel and Its Future, 60 Nw. L. Rev. 95 (1965) (The article does, however, give an excellent discussion of the alternative remedies available to the Court.); McNamara, Recent Developments Concerning Constitutional limitations on State Defamation Laws, 18 VAND. L. REV. 1454-55
(1965); Nelson, Newsmen and The Times Doctrine, 12 VILL. L. REv. 738 (1967); and Kalven, supra
note 27. Alexander Meikeljohn was quoted as saying, "It is (the decision) an occasion for dancing
in the streets." ' Kalven, supra note 27, at 22 In. 125.
39. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). The Garrison case also applied the Times standard to a criminal, as
opposed to civil, libel action.
40. 380 U.S. 356 (1964).
41. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
Published
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In that case, the Court applied the designation to a retiredcounty supervisor of a
recreation area, because the management of the area "was still a matter of lively
'43
public interest.
44
Later cases held public officials to be: a county clerk running for re-election,
45
46
a deputy sheriff, the members of a local schoolboard, a senatorial candidate
in a primary election, 47 a deputy chief of detectives,48 and a mayor running for
49
election as a county tax assessor.
The Supreme Court has applied the public official designation to a wide
variety of people including officeholders, political candidates, and retired
officials. Inferior courts have also liberally interpreted the term, to the point of
deeming an ordinary policeman, 50 a school principal, 5 1 and a part-time accountant for public waterworks, 52 public officials.
B. What constitutes "actual maliceT'
The public official 53 plaintiff must prove three things in order to be awarded
a judgment against critics of his official conduct. He must first prove that the
statements were made "of and concerning him. ' 54 "Impersonal discussion of
governmental activity" is privileged.5 5 Secondly, plaintiff must prove that the
statements were false. 56 The exaggeration, half-truth, or accusation is not
43. Id. at 87n. 14.
44. Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967).
45. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
46. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
47. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
48. Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
49. Ocala Star Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
50. Tucker v. Kilgore, Ky., 388 S.W. 2d 112 (1965). Gilligan v. King, 48 Misc. 2d 212 (1965).
51. Reaves v. Foster, Miss., 200 So. 2d 453 (1967).
52. Krutech v. Schimmel, 27 App. Div. 2d, 837, 278 N.Y.S. 2d 25 (). This case, and two of the
above, was cited in Prosser, supra note 5, at 821n. 18. For other citations of illustrative cases, see
DiMatteo, Time Marches On: The Courts Continuing Expansion of the Application of the Actual
Malice' Standard, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 160n. 83 (1971) [hereinafter cited as DiMatteo], and
Standards, supra note 12, at 395n. 18.
53. The Supreme Court has applied the actual malice standard to the defamation of public
figures (Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967),
see text infra at notes 78-89) and labor disputes (Linn v. United Auto Plant Workers, 383 U.S. 53
(1965); Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974)) so the discussion of the actual malice standard
will encompass these cases, in addition to the cases involving public officials.
54. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 290-94 (1964).
55. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 82 (1966).
56. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) and Monitor Patriot v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265,
272, (1971). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS has stated that, "To create liability for defamation, there must be publication of matter which is both defamatory and false. The truth of a defamatory statement of fact is a complete defense to an action for defamation, although it is made
for no good purpose and is inspired by ill will toward the person about whom it is published and is
made solely for the purpose of harming him. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 582 (1)(a) (Tent.
Draft No. 21, 1975).
57. Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 275 (1974).
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prohibited.5 7 Likewise, the use of the derisive epithet or rhetorical hyperbole is
allowed .58

Thirdly, plaintiff must present "clear and convincing" 59 proof that defendant
published false statements with either knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of the truth. Knowledge of the falsity of the charges is demonstrated by proof of an "intent to inflict harm through falsehood," but not by
proof of simply an "intent to inflict harm." 60 Proof of only common-law malice
will not suffice to defease the privilege; plaintiff must prove that defendant published knowing his words to be false.
Reckless disregard of the truth is shown by proof that defendant published
his statements with a "high degree of awareness of their probable falsity."61
Recklessness is clearly not demonstrated by proof of only ordinary negligence.
The Court has stated: "The test which we laid down in New York Times is not
keyed to ordinary care; defeasance of the privilege is conditioned, not on mere
'62
negligence, but on reckless disregard of the truth.
63
Decisions in three cases illustrate this principle. In St. Amant v. Thompson,
lack of investigation into and verification of sworn statements by an informant
did not constitute recklessness. In Ocala Star Banner Co. v. Damron,64 sloppy
investigation confusing the plaintiff with his brother, resulting in a false
allegation that the plaintiff had been charged with the crime of perjury, did
not constitute recklessness. And in lime, Inc. v. Pape,65 omission of the word
"alleged," representing a rational but incorrect interpretation of an ambiguous
document, did not constitute recklessness.
What then would constitute reckless disregard of the truth? The Court gave
some indication in St. Amant v. Thompson:
[Recklessness is probably] shown where a story is fabricated by the
defendant, is the product of his imagination, or is based wholly on
an unverified anonymous telephone call.... [It is also shown] when the
58. Greenbelt Publishing Assn. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970). And in a later case, the Court
stated that "however pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend on its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
59. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). See also New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 83 (1967).
60. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964). See also Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357
(1965); Beckley Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 82 (1967); Greenbelt Publishing Assn. v.
Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 10, 11 (1970); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 52n. 18 (1971); Letter
Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 291-92 (1974).
61. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,
731 (1968).
62. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 79 (1964).
63. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
64. 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
65. 401 U.S. 279 (1971). The difference between recklessness and negligence is shown by the
fact that the rational interpretation of an ambiguous document, not actionable under a standard of
recklessness is probably actionable under a negligence standard. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U.S. 448, 459n.4 (1976).
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publisher's allegations are so inherently improbable that only a reckless
man would have put them into circulation. Likewise, recklessness may
be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the
66
informant or the accuracy of his reports.
And in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 67 recklessness appears to have been
shown by a lack of verification of source material, combined with a policy of
"sophisticated muckraking" in a situation where investigation was necessary
and possible. In no other case has the Court found recklessness.
C. What Criticism Relates to the Official Conduct of Public Officials?
Criticism relating to official conduct encompasses "anything which might
touch on an official's fitness for office," even though such criticism "may also
affect the official's private character." 68 Included are allegations of criminal
conduct, "no matter how remote in time or place." 69 The criminal charges in
Garrison v. Louisiana,70 (corruption); Rosenblatt v. Baer,71 (speculation); St.
73
Amant v. Thompson,7 2 (also corruption); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy,
74
(previous bootlegging); and Ocala Star Banner Co. v. Damron, (prejury); were
all held to relate to official conduct in that they might have touched on the
75
official's fitness for office. Criticism of an official's policy on fluoridation,
77
misleading charges of police brutality, 76 and allegations of a "diabolical plot,"
were also held to relate to official conduct.
IV. The Application of the Times Privilege to the Defamation of Public
Figures
Two companion cases brought to the Court in 1967, Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts78 and Associated Press v. Walker,79 concerned the applicability of the
Times privilege to the defamation of public figures. The publication at issue
in Butts was an article in defendant's magazine, The Saturday Evening Post,
entitled "The Story of a College Football Fix." The article accused Wally Butts,
then athletic director of the University of Georgia, of conspiring to "fix" the
1962 Georgia-Alabama football game. The basis of the charge was an overheard
66. 390 U.S. at 732.
67. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Only one justice decided the case on the basis that recklessness had
been proven. Four justices based recovery on a less demanding standard, though they also thought
that recklessness had probably been shown. Id. at 161n.23. Two justices thought that the question
of liability should have been determined on remand, though these justices also thought that recklessness had been shown. Id. at 172-74.
68. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964).
69. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971).
70. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
71. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
72. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
73. 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
74. Id.at 295.
75. Beckley Newspapers Corp. V. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967).
76. Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
77. Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965).
78. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
79. Id.
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phone call between Butts and the head coach of Alabama, Paul "Bear" Bryant.
Eager to change its image to that of "sophisticated muckraker," the Post published the article without any thorough investigation of the phone call or other
substantiation for the charge of a "fix." 80 After the article was published, Butts
resigned from his post at the University of Georgia and brought a diversity
action for libel in disrict court. In district court, he was awarded a verdict and a
judgment for damages in the amount of 3 million dollars. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the verdict but reduced the amount of damages to 460,000 dollars.
The second case, Associated Press v. Walker, involved an Associated Press
news dispatch during the turbulent period when James Meredith, a black student, was forcibly enrolled in the University of Mississippi. The news dispatch,
written by a reporter who had been present during the turmoil, claimed that
former general Edwin Walker had led a violent crowd against federal marshals
attempting to enroll the unwelcome student. Walker, who had spoken out
against -federal intervention prior to the incident and who had been present
during the incident, claimed that the charges that he had aided and abetted
violence was false and libelous. In his action for libel in Texas state court, he was
awarded 500,000 dollars in damages. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed
and the Texas Supreme Court declined to review. This case was brought to the
U. S. Supreme Court with Butts on a writ of certiorari.
The Court unanimously reversed the verdict in Walker, but affirmed the verdict in Butts by a five to four decision. The cases were differentiated on the
need for rapid dissemination of the pertinent information and the reliability of
the sources. The plurality stated that in Walker,
Considering the necessity for rapid dissemination, nothing in this
series of events gives the slightest hint of a severe departure from
accepted publishing standards ... [on the other hand] the Butts story
was in no sense "hot news" and the editors of the magazine recognized
the need for a thorough investigation of the serious charges. 8'
While the Associated Press source "gave every indication of being trustworthy
and competent,"82 the Post had every reason to doubt the veracity of its
source.
Three standards of liability emerged from the decisions. Fourjustices, Harlan,
Clark, Stewart, and Fortas, thought that recovery should be conditioned upon a
finding of "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from
the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers. '83 Two justices, Black and Douglas, thought the press should
have an absolute immunity from libel ju'dgments. Three justices, Brennan,
White, and Chief Justice Warren, thought the actual malice standard to be
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

157-59.
159, 167.
158.
155.
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applicable to the defamation of public figures. 84 This standard, the application
of the Times privilege to the defamation of public figures, became the
applicable rule. 85 For in Walker, the absolutists gave their support to the

standard which would give the press the most protection, the actual malice
standard.
Little else can be gleaned from the decisions. No clear definition of the term
"public figure" emerged, primarily because the opinion announcing the judgments of the Court was actually a minority opinion espousing a rejected
rationale.8 6 The issue of limits to the application of the Times privilege was also
left in limbo. Would criticism of a public figure's private life be privileged or
would criticism have to be limited to the area in which the public figure was
prominent?
The decision can, however, be criticized in general terms, concerning the
wisdom of applying the imes rule to those conventionally deemed to be public
figures. First, public figures, in comparison to public officials, do not enjoy an
immunity from libel actions for their own statements so the analogous privilege
rationale developed in Times is inapposite. 87 Secondly, the pertinent laws of the
instant cases were not laws of seditious libel especially repugnant to democratic
84. The voting was as follows. Justices Harlan, Clark, Stewart, and Fortas comprising the
plurality and applying the "highly unreasonable conduct" test voted for recovery in Butts, but not in
Walker. Chief Justice Warren applying the actual malice test also voted for recovering in Butts, but
not in Walker. Justices White and Brennan also applying the actual malice standard thought that
the standard had not been met in Walker. In Butts, these justices voted to remand on the grounds of
improper instruction to the jury by the trial judge though they, like Warren, thought that actual
malice had been shown. Justices Douglas and Black thought the judgments in both cases constitutionally infirm because the "First Amendment was intended to leave the press free from the
harassment of libel judgments." Id. at 172. In Walker, the justices lend their support to the actual
malice standard believing it to give the press more protection than the "highly unreasonable conduct" test propounded by the plurality. For a "judicial scorecard" and a thoughtful analysis of the
two cases, see Kalven, The Reasonable Men and the First Amendment: Hill Butts, and Walker
1967 Sup. CT. REV.
85. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 30 (1971); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 328 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976); Standards, supra note
12, at 396: DiMatteo, supra note 52, at 157-58; Comment, The Expanding ConstitutionalProtection for the News Media from Liability of Defamation: Predictability and the News Synthesis,
70 MICH. L. REV. 1547, 1549 (1972) (hereinafter cited as the New Synthesis); and Forbes et al.,
Federalizationof State Defamation Law, 15 WASHBURN L.J. 290, 301 (1976) (hereinafter cited as
Federalization). But see Greenbelt Publishing Assn. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 12 (1970).
86. In Greenbelt Publishing Assn. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6(1970), the Court was forced to fashion
its own definition of the term public figure, by using various common law definitions and the definitions suggested by the Butts court. The Court's definitions are as follows. The plurality defined a
public figure as one who had "commanded a substantial amount of independent public interest at
the time of publications . . . [either] by position along [or by the] thrusting of his personality into
'vortex' of an important public controversy." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55
(1967). Chief Justice Warren defined public figures as those involved in the "resolution of important
public questions who by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large."
Id. at 163-64.
87. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.s. 130, 153 (1967); supra note 31.
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processes. 88 Thirdly, despite Mr. Chief Justice Warren's contention that distinctions between the public and private sectors have become blurred in the
twentieth century,8 9 in general, the public has a lesser interest in securing uninhibited criticism of public figures than of public officials.
V. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia: The Application of the Actual Malice
Standard to the Discussion of All Issues of Public Interest
While Butts and Walker involved the defamation of public figures involved
in issues of public interest, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia concerned the defamation of a private person during the discussion of an issue of public interest. On
October 1, 1963, and again on October 4, in the city of Philadelphia, George
Rosenbloom was arrested for possession of obscene material. Respondent's
radio station WIP broadcast the following item: "City Cracks Down on Smut
Merchants." 90 In its first broadcast of a series, the station said that police had
confiscated three thousand obscene books. Later broadcasts were corrected
to use the phrase "allegedly obscene."
Rosenbloom later sought an injunction against police interference with his
business and the disparaging characterization of his business by various news
media. WIP characterized the action in this way:
The girlie-book peddlers say the police crackdown and continued reference to their borderline literature as smut or filth is hurting their
business.., if the injunction is not granted.., it could signal an even
more intense effort to rid the city of pornography. 91
In May of 1964, Rosenbloom was acquitted of the obscenity charges under
instruction from the trial judge that, as a matter of law, the materials were not
obscene. Rosenbloom then brought a diversity action for libel, contending that
the characterization of his books as obscene, he and his associates as "girliebook peddlers," and his injunctive suit as an attempt to force police to "lay off
92
the smut literature racket," constituted libel per se.
In District Court, Rosenbloom was awarded 750,000 dollars in damages
which were reduced to 250,000 dollars on remittur. The Court of Appeals
reversed holding that the Times privilege applied despite the fact that Rosenbloom was not a public figure or public official. The U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed and the plurality held that the Times privilege applies to the discussion
of public issues without regard to the status of the person defamed. Because the
plurality rule became the rule of law in most jurisdictions, it is worth
93
examining.
88. See Id. at 153-55.
89. See Id. at 164.
90. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 33 (1971).
91. Id. at 35.
92. See Id. at 36.
93. See cases cited in White, supra note 5, at 377-79n.10; New Synthesis, supra note 84, at
1560-62n.94-96; Anderson, supra note 36, at 447n.121. For a criticism of the lower court's
acceptance of the Rosenbloom plurality as a rule of law, see Note, Misinterpreting the Supreme
Court: An Analysis of How the Constitutional Privilege to Defame Has Been Incorrectly
Expanded, 10 IDAHO L. REV. 213 (1974).
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The plurality thought that neither the interest in information nor in good
name was correctly protected by distinctions in standards of liability between
public figures and private people. The plurality theorized that such distinctions may,
• . . easily produce the paradoxical result of dampening discussion of
issues of public or general concern because they happen to involve
private citizens while extending constitutional encouragement to discussion of aspects of the lives of 'public figures' that are not in the
94
area of public or general concern.
The plurality thought that differentiating between public figures and private
people was not meaningful in terms of either access to the media or assumed risk
of defamation. On the contention that public figures can counter defamation
better than private people, the plurality stated:
Denials, retractions, and corrections are not 'hot' news, and rarely
receive the prominence of the original story ....
In the vast majority
of libels involving public officials or public figures, the ability to
respond through the media will depend on the same complex factor on
which the ability of a private individual depends: the unpredictable
event of the media's continuing interest in the story. Thus the unproved,
and highly improbable, generalization that an as yet, undefined class
of "public figures" involved in matters of public concern will be better
able to respond through the media than private individuals also involved in such matters seems too insubstantial a reed on which to rest a
95
constitutional distinction.
The plurality continued:
If the States fear that private citizens will not be able to respond
adequately to publicity involving them, the solution lies in the direction
of ensuring their ability to respond, rather than in stifling public
96
discussion of matters of public concern.
The plurality also rejected the idea that public figures had lost some stake in
their reputation because of their assumption of prominence. The plurality
contended that the elaboration of constitutional privileges to defame public
officials and public figures in no way reflected a devaluation of the importance
of good name to these two classes of people, but represented a recognition of the
importance of protecting uninhibited discussion of public issues. After concluding that public people had lost no reputational interest because of their
status, the plurality decided that neither had private people acquired one. The
plurality concluded that private people deserve no special consideration be94. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971).
95. Id. at 46-47.
96. Id. at 47; See also, supra note 12.

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol10/iss2/3

14

Gutman: The Attempt to Develop an Appropriate Standard of Liability for t
FEDERA LIZA TION OF LIBEL LA W
cause, 'exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life
in a civilized community.' 97
The new standard is appealing. Status determinations are eliminated. Substituted in their place is the ostensibly simple task of determining whether an
issue is public or private. To insure that "debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," 98 protection is given to the debate itself in
lieu of granting a privilege to defame notable people. Information not pertaining to subjects of public interest, such as commentary on the private lives
of public figures, is left unprotected. Information about subjects of public
interest is, however, protected; and it is finally recognized that there is a substantial public interest in acquiring information about public issues in which
private people are involved.
The difficulty with the new standard is that lower courts have held few topics
to be beyond the octopus-like scope of the term "public interest."'99 Public
interest has been found in subjects ranging from errant golf shots to the behavior of a political candidate's children. 100 One author thought that under the
Rosenbloom standard, "the very fact that a news medium reports an event might
be said to create a virtually conclusive presumption that the event is of public
concern."' 0 1 Little remains of the interest in good name if the discussion of
almost all issues is given the protection of the actual malice standard. The
Rosenbloom standard protects unimportant information with the cost of giving
the citizen little recourse for injury to his reputation. The Court in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. would attempt to balance more prudently the interests in
good name and free press.
VI. Gertz v. Robert Welch: Rejection of Rosenbloom, Affirmation of
Butts and Walker, and Some New Rules for Media Defamation of
Private People
Petitioner Elmer Gertz was a lawyer representing a family named Nelson in
civil litigation against a policeman named Nucio. Nucio had been found guilty
of second degree murder for the killing of the Nelson youth. Respondent Robert
Welch, Inc. published American Opinion, a monthly magazine of the John Birch
Society. An article in the magazine entitled, "Frame Up: Richard Nucio And
The War On Police," falsely stated that petitioner had framed Nucio in the
criminal prosecution, had a criminal record, had taken part in the 1968 demon97. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967). Time involved the conflict between freedom
of speech and the private individual's right to privacy. The Court in that case concluded that
a private individual must prove actual malice on the part of the publisher of an article about a subject of public interest. The decision in ime was a precedent for the use of a public issue standard,
though right to good name and right to privacy considerations differ.
98. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
99. See New Synihesis, supra note 84, at 1560-62n. 94-96; White, supra note 5, at 377-79n.

10.
100. See Sellers v. Time, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Pa. 1969); News-Journal Co. v. Gallagher,
133 A. 2d 166 (1967).
101. Note, Media Privilege to Report Events of Public Interest, 85 HARv L. REv. 222,226(1971).
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strations in Chicago, and had been a member of the "Marxist League for In02
dustrial Democracy," and the "Intercollegiate Socialist Society."
In his suit for libel in district court, Gertz was denied recovery for damages
because the court found he had not proved actual malice on the part of the
publisher as required by Rosenbloom. The Court of Appeals affirmed also
finding the 77mes standard apposite. The U. S. Supreme Court reversed and
held that a private person need not prove actual malice on the part of the publisher of an article about a subject of public interest or concern.0 3 The Court
decided that only public figures and public officials are required to prove actual
malice in an action for libel. The Court rejected, but did not explicitly overrule,
the Rosenbloom standard and elaborated a complicated set of rules for determining the standard of liability in a given situation.
The Court first decided that public figures must prove actual malice in their
actions for libel. Two categories of people were said to fall within the scope of the
term. The first category is comprised of those few people who are deemed to be
public figures for all purposes because of their assumption of roles of "especial
prominence in the affairs of society.""' 4 The second category is comprised of
that greater number of people who are public figures for the purpose of a
particular issue because they, "have thrust themselves to the forefront of (that)
particular public controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved."' 0 5 In both categories, the Gertz Court conditioned its public figure
test on the voluntariness of the plaintiff in seeking publicity, either by occupying
a prominent role in society or by attempting to influence the resolution of a particular issue. The public figure's exposure to defamation was deemed justifiable
because of his ability to respond through the media. 06 Ability to respond and
voluntariness in incurring risk to reputation, factors deemed unimportant by the
Rosenbloom plurality, were accorded decisive significance by the Gertz Court.
Because the private person had not voluntarily run the risk of injury to good
name and because he had little likelihood of "securing access to channels of communication sufficient to rebut falsehood concerning him," 0 7 the Court thought
that he was more deserving of recovery than the public figure and should not
102. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 326 (1974).
103. The Court's opinion was written by Justice Powell and the majority was composed of Justices
Stewart, Marshall, Powell, Rehnquist, and Blackmun. Justice Blackmun, however, who had joined
the plurality in Rosenbloom, stated that he joined in the Court's opinion only to create a majority.
See! Id. at 353 (separate opinion of Justice Blackmun). Justice Blackmun's reticence in joining the
majority's opinion undercuts the vitality of the majority position, and some authors have even
spoken of the Court's opinion as being in fact, a plurality opinion. I will, however, speak of
the opinion of the five justices as a majority position and the rules propounded as rules of the Court.
104. Id. at 345.
105. Id. See note 86 supra for the two-tier public figure standard suggested by the Butts
plurality, upon which the Gertz public figures standard appears to be based.
106. The Court stated: "Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater
access to the channels of effective communication, and hence, have a more realistic opportunity to
counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy.'Id. at 344 (Footnote omitted).
107. J. Harlan, dissenting, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 70 (1971)cited in Id.
at 338.
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have the burden of proving actual malice. On the other hand, leaving the standard of liability to the rules of state tort law could result in a publisher being held
liable in damages for defamatory error though he had taken "every reasonable
precaution to ensure the accuracy of (his) assertions.""',, The Court, therefore,
attempted to reach a prudent middle ground of recovery between the restrictiveness of actual malice and the relative ease of state tort law.
The Gertz rules for media defamation of a private person' 09 are as follows:
states may not impose liability without fault though they are free to develop
another standard; punitive or presumed damages cannot be awarded absent a
finding of actual malice; absent that finding, states may compensate only for
actual injury which encompasses all normal tort damages including humiliation
and suffering. "10 The fault requirement prohibits absolute liability for erroneous
statements; states must find a defendant at least negligent before holding him
liable. A state does, however, have the option of conditioning recovery upon
fulfillment of a more restrictive standard than negligence such as actual malice.
After elaborating the proper standards of liability for public figures and
private people, the Court proceeded to the issues in the instant case. The Court
found Gertz not to be a public figure under the new definition because he had
not "general fame or notoriety in the community,"'I' and had not "thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue. '"" 12 The Court then decided whether a
constitutionally permissible standard of liability for the media defamation of a
private person had been applied. The Supreme Court found the trial court in
108. Id. at 346.
109. This discussion examines what appear to be the minimum parameters of the standard.
See notes 134-45 supra.
110. See Id. at 347-50 for the Court's explanation and justification of the new rules, see, however, White, supra note 5 for a harsh and detailed criticism of the rules. For a good overview of the
standard, see Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation:New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to Gertz v.
Welch, Inc. And Beyond," 6 RUT.'CAM. L.J. 47 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Frakt]. And for the
thesis that the rules operate on the "wrong side of the litigation," see Anderson, supra note 36.
Ill. The Court Stated:
Petitioner has long been active in community and professional affairs. He has served as
an officer of local civic groups and of various professional organizations, and he has
published several books and articles on legal subjects. Although petitioner was consequently well known in some circles, he had achieved no general fame or notoriety in the
community. None of the prospective jurors called at the trial had ever heard of petitioner
prior to this litigation, and respondent offered no proof that this response was typical of
the local population. We would not lightly assume that a citizen's participation in
community and professional affairs rendered him a public figure forall purposes. Absent
clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement
in the arrairs of society, an individual should not be deemed a public personality for all
aspects of his life.
112. The Court thought Gertz not to be a limited purpose public figure because,
[he] played a minimal role at the coroner's inquest, and his participation related solely to
his representation of a private client. He took no part in the criminal prosecution of Officer
Nuccio. Moreover, he never discussed either the criminal or civil litigation with the press
and was never quoted as having done so. He plainly did not trust himself into the vortex of
this public issue, nor did he engage the public's attention in an attempt to influence its outcome.
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error in that the jury was permitted to impose liability without fault and to
presume damages without proof of injury.11 3 The Court, therefore, reversed and
remanded.
15
VII. Time, Inc. v. Firestone:14 "Sowing The Seed of Gertz""
Time, Inc. v. Firestone concerned the defamation of a person of uncertain
status involved in an issue of apparent public interest. On December 15, 1967,
Russell Firestone, an heir to the Firestone rubber fortune, was granted a
divorce from respondent, Mary Alice Firestone, on the grounds of extreme
cruelty and a lack of domestication. Time magazine erroneously reported that
the divorce had been granted for extreme cruelty and adultery, perhaps misled
by the fact that Mr. Firestone's original claim was for extreme cruelty and
6
adultery. 1"
Mrs. Firestone filed a libel action against the publisher of Time magazine and
was awarded 100,000 dollars in damages in Florida Circuit Court. The verdict
was ultimately affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court." 7 The U.S. Supreme
Court accepted the case on a writ of certiorari.
Following Gertz, the Supreme Court first decided the question of Mrs.
Firestone's status. The court determined that Mrs. Firestone was neither an allpurpose or limited-purpose public figure within the Gertz definition of the
term. The Court stated:
Respondent did not assume any role of especial prominence in the
affairs of society, other than perhaps Palm Beach society, and she did
not thrust herself to the forefront of any particular public controversy in
order to influence the resolution of the issues involved in it. 18
The Court found that not only had Mrs. Firestone's participation in the divorce
not constituted voluntary involvement, but that a divorce "cause celebre" was
not a "public controversy" within the Gertz definition of that term.' 19 An
individual is not, therefore, rendered a public figure simply by voluntary participation in an issue of interest to the public; he must participate in a "public
113. See Id. at 352. See note 110 supra for summary of these rules. Because Illinois had a doctrine
of libel per se at the time of publication, (See note 5 supra) and therefore held some statements to be
actionable on their faces and permitted recovery of damages without proof of injury in these areas,
the fault and actual injury requirements could not have been met.
114. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
115. This is Marsha Taubenhaus' appropriate title. See Taubenhaus, Time, Inc. v. Firestone:
Sowing The Seeds of Gertz, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 123 (1976).
116. See 424 U.S. at 451-52.
117. For a good discussion of the legal tribulations which occurred in the instant case, see Recent
Decisions, The Firestone Case: A Judicial Exercise In Press Censorship, 25 EMORY L.J. 705-8
(1976).
118. Time, Inc. v. Frestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976).
119. Id. at 454-55. But see, Justice Marshall's dissent in which he contends that Mrs. Firstone
had voluntarily participated in a "public controversy" (Id. at 484), and she therefore, should have
been deemed a public figure for the purpose of the divorce.
See Christie, Injur, to Reputation And The Constitution: Confusion Amid Conflicting
Approaches, 75 MicH L. R~v. 43, 54 (1976) for a similar argument.
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controversy," though the exact meaning of the term is not yet known. 120
After determining that Mrs. Firestone was not a voluntary participant in a
"public controversy," the Court decided whether a constitutionally permissible
standard of liability for media defamation of a private person had been used.
The Court found the rendering of a judgment without a prior finding of fault
on the part of the publisher constitutionally infirm under the Gertz standard.'12
The Court, therefore, vacated and remanded. In formulating its decision, the
FirestoreCourt relied upon the Gertz rules for standards of liability and status
determinations. Whether the Gertz rules should retain their vitality in the future
is a question that will be discussed in the conclusion of this article.
VIII. The Gertz Rules and Libel Law Today
Before discussing future developments, it is at first useful to summarize the
state of libel law, today. Public officials must still prove actual malice in libel
actions against critics of their official conduct. The class of public officials is
comprised of at the least, "those among the hierarchy of governmental employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility
for, or control over the conduct of governmental affairs."' 22 Criticism relating to
official conduct encompasses "anything which might touch on an official's
fitness for office."' 123 Actual malice is shown by "clear and convincing proofP124
that defendant had either an "intent to inflict harm through falsehood" 125 or a
"high degree of awareness" of the probable falsity of his statements. 26
120. The Court did not define the term "public controversy", except to say that it does not include
"all controversies of interest to the public" such as a marriage "cause celebre." Id. at 454.
121. The Court stated:
Gertz established, however, that not only must there be evidence to support an award of
compensatory damages, there must also be evidence of some fault on the part of a
defendant charged with publishing defamatory material. No question of fault was
submitted to the jury in this case, because under Florida law, the only findings required
for determination of liability were whether the article was defamatory, whether it was
true, and whether the defamation, if any, caused respondent harm.
The failure to submit the question of fault to the jury does not of itself establish noncompliance with the constitutional requirements established in Gertz, however, Nothing
in the Constitution requires that assessment of fault in a civil case tried in a state court be
made by ajury, nor is there any prohibition against such a finding being made in the first
instance by an appellate, rather than a trial court. The First and Fourteenth Amendments
do not impose upon the States any limitations as to how, within their own judicial
systems, fact finding tasks shall be allocated. If we were satisfied that one of the Florida
courts which considered this case had supportably ascertained petitioner was at fault, we
would be required to affirm the judgment below." Id. at 461-62.
Further in its opinion, the Court stated that the Florida Supreme Court's characterization of the report by Time, as a flagrant example ofjournalistic negligence, Id. (at
463) did not constitute a "conscious determination" of fault. So, to have satisfactorily
decided the issue of fault, a court has to have had made some inquire into the standard
of care used by the defendant, and have found defendant guilty of at least negligence
122. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
123. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964).
124. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
125. See generally supra note 60.
126. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727, 731 (1968).
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Public figures must also prove actual malice to be awarded judgments for
libel. Public figures for all purposes are those who occupy roles of "especial
prominence in the affairs of society."' 1 7 Public figures for the purposes of a particular public controversy are those who "have thrust themselves to the forefront of (that)'particular public controversy in order to influence the resolution
128
of the issues involved."'
Private persons are not required to prove actual malice, but must show some
29
degree of fault on the part of a media disseminator of defamatory falsehoods. 1
If fault can be shown, compensation is limited to actual injury unless actual
malice has been proved, in which case presumed or punitive damages may be
30
awarded. 1
Libel law today is rightly characterized as a "confused and meandering
state of affairs."'131 The Gertz Court introduced nuances and distinctions into the
law which could confound even the most knowledgeable jurist. A court in a
defamation case is first called upon to determine the status of the plaintiff. But
the two-tier public figure definition is not susceptible of easy application, as can
be seen in some decisions by lower courts after Gertz. 132 Particularly difficult is
ascertaining at what point an individual's involvement in an issue renders him
a public figure for the purposes of that issue. In short, as one district court judge
observed, "[d]efining public figures is much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the
33
wall."1
If an individual is not deemed a public person, the rules of liability become
almost unfathomable. It is clear that some constitutional protection is given
to some types of defamation not involving public people. Exactly what types of
defamation are given constitutional protection is the difficult question. The
view best supported by dicta in Gertz is that, in cases involving defamation of
private people, constitutional protection is given only if the media is the
instrument of defamation. The Gertz Court spoke of the "appropriate standard
of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a
134
private person."
127. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 347.

130. Id. at 349-50.
131. Elovitz, Libel Law: A Confused And Meandering State o

Affairs, 6 CuM. L. REV. 667

(1976).
132. In two cases, relatives ofwell-known people were deemed public figures despite their seeming
lack of especial prominence or desire to become involved in a particular issue. See Carson v. Allied
News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976); Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29 (D.D.N.Y. 1974).
Much of the discussion of the public figure cases is based upon Feinstein, Persistence of Illogic:
Further Constitutional Aspects of the Law of Defamation, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635, 654-55 (1977).
See also Note, The Editorial Function and the Gertz Public Figure Standard, 87 YALE L.J. 1723,
1748 (1978).
133. Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976).
134. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974). See also Id. at 340-41, 354-55 (C. J.
Burger dissenting).
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This view has, however, been rejected by most law reviews and lower courts
which have examined it.' 31 The Second Restatement of Torts explained the
imprudence of restricting the rules to media defamation:
It would seem strange to hold that the press, composed of professionals and
causing much greater damage because of their wider distribution of the communication, can constitutionally be held liable only for negligence, but that
a private person, engaged in a casual conversation with a single person,
can be held liable at his peril if the statement turns out to be false, without
36
regard to his lack of fault.1
Not only is it unclear which disseminators of information are protected, it is
also unclear what type of information is protected. Must a communication
pertain to a matter of public interest? 137 It would appear paradoxical that media
defamation not pertaining to a public issue would be constitutionally protected, though defamation by a non-media source relating to a matter of public
concern might not. Yet, in Firestone,the Court appeared to sanction exactly
that type of rule. In that case, the Court extended constitutional protection
(the Gertz rules for defamation of non-public people; see text supra at note 110
for the statement of those rules) to media defamation not concerning a "public
controversy," while refraining from granting a constitutional privilege to defame
during the discussion of a public issue if the defamer is not part of the media. 38
Not only is it unclear as to the ambit of constitutional protection under the
Court's rulings, also unclear is what protection must accrue to protected communications. The Court stated that in protected areas, in the absence of a
showing of actual malice, awards of damages are limited to compensation for
"actual injury." 39 Yet, in Gertz the Court thought compensation to be per135. See Note, The Editorial Function and the Gertz Public Figure Standard, 87 YALE L.J.
1723, 1724n.6( 1978); Note, Constitutional Law-Reformulation of the Constitutional Privilege to
DeJane, 24 KAN. L. REV. 406, 418-20 (1976); Keeton, Dejaination and Freedom of the Press, 54
TEX. L. REV. 1221, 1237 (1976); Collins & Drushal, The Reaction of the State Courts to Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 28 CASE W. L. REV. 306, 332-34 (1978) (hereinafter cited as Collins); Frakt,
supra note 110, at 509-10 pointing out that the Court has applied the actual malice standard to
non-media defamation in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 727 (1968) and St. Amant v. Thompson,
390 U.S. 727 (1968). See cases cited in Frank at 509-10 in which state courts applied the actual
malice standard to non-media defamation cases. For state court holdings that the Gertz privilege is
not restricted in the media, see Jacron Sales Co., v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976).;
General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165,352 A.2d 810 (1976). For the general idea that the First
Amendment provides no special rights to the press, see Branzburg v. Hays, 408 U.S. 665 (1972);
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). For the idea that Gertz can be limited to the
media because of special guarantees contained in the press clause, see Justice Stewart, Or of the
Press, 26 Hastings L. J. 631 (1975); Nimmer, INTRODUCTION-Is FREEDOM OF THE PRESS A REDUNDance: WHAT DOES IT ADD TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975); Brosnahan, From
Times V. Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years 26 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 793 (1975); Calero v. Del.
Chem. Corp., 68 Wis.2d 487, 500, 228 N.W.2d 737, 745 (1975).
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580 B. comment D (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975).
137. Justice White dissenting in Gertz thought the Gertz rules for defamation of non-public people would apply to all defamatory suits, regardless of the issue involved. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 373n.5 (1973).
138. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448.
139. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
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mitted for "mental anguish and suffering."' 40 And in Firestone, the Court
permitted recovery for factors unrelated to compensation for actual injury. 14, So
the protective influence of the actual injury requirement appears confusing and
illusory.
More important than the question of damages is the question of general
liability for defamatory statements. The Court in Gertz stated that, ". . . so long
as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability ... "142 The court holds that, at the
least, publishers must be found negligent before being held liable. And most
states have chosen to adopt a negligence standard in protected areas involving
private people. 143
But a standard of journalistic negligence is not easily manageable. No clear or
44
widely-accepted definition of journalistic negligence has yet been developed. 1
The effect of this unclarity may be to allow juries to evaluate negligence on the
basis of the content of the material published rather than on the investigatory
45
procedures employed.
IX. A Proposal For An Alternative Standard of Liability
The Gertz standard has failed to provide a workable mechanism for balancing
the conflicting equities present in the area of public libel. The ambiguity surrounding the Gertz definitions of the terms "especial prominence," "public
controversy," and "actual injury," leads to uneven results and possible punishment of unpopular opinion. In addition, the ambit question remains unresolved:
140. Id. at 350.
141. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976). Justice Brennan comments: "In this case,
the $100,000 damage award was premised entirely on the injury of pain and anguish. All claims as to
injury to reputation were withdrawn prior to trial, and no evidence concerning damage to reputation
were presented at trial." Id. at 475n.3 (J. Brennan dissenting).
142. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
143. See Collins, supra note 135, at 343.
144. Id. at 326-27; Anderson, supra note 36, at 454-62; Green, Continuing the Privacy' Discussion: A Response to Judge Wright and President Bloustein 46 TEx. L. REV. 750, 754 (1968); Kalven,
The Reasonable Man And The First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 SuP. CT. REv. 267,
302-08; Anderson, A Response to Professor Robertson; The Issue Is Control of Press Power, 54
TEX. L. REV. 271, 278-80 (1976).
145. J. Brennan notes: "And most hazardous, the flexibility which inheres in the reasonable-care
standard will create the danger that a jury will convert it into an instrument for the suppression of
those 'vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks,' which must be protected if the
guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments are to prevail." Justice Brennan, dissenting, in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 367 (1974) citing Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S.
265, 277 (1971); New York Times Co. V. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270(1964). See Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374, 383 (1967); Anderson supra note 36, at 454-56; Note, Media Privilege to Report
Matters of Public Interest, 85 HARV. L. REV. 222, 228 (1971). For an example of apparent punishment of unpopular views and unorthodox style,See Sprouse v. Clay Communications, Inc., W.Va.
211 S.E. 2d 674 (1975) cert. denied, (1975). For a defense of the reasonable care standard, See Justice
Harlan's separate opinion in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 406 (1967).

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol10/iss2/3

22

Gutman: The Attempt to Develop an Appropriate Standard of Liability for t
FEDERA LIZA TION OF LIBEL LA W
What forms of communication are given the protection of the Gertz rules for
defamation of non-public people? 146 Not only in its unclarity, but also in its
assignment of constitutional protection is the Gertz standard defective. Discussion of the private lives of all-purpose public figures is protected by the actual
malice standard while discussion of public issues involving private people is
given lesser or no protection.
An alternative method of assigning constitutional protection is the public
concern standard. This standard would protect the discussion of all issues of
public concern, without regard for the status of the person defamed, with the
actual malice standard.147 Speech not relating to matters of public concern
would not be given federal protection, and the applicable standard of liability
would be determined by each state. The term, public concern, applies to the discussion of all activities relating to the functioning of self-government. 48
Included are those issues of social and political importance for which the public
49
must receive information if it is to sagaciously conduct its decision-making. 1
146. See notes 134-38 supra, for discussion of the ambit question.
147. The actual malice standard is used instead of the reasonable care standard because of the
unclarity, and possibility of punishment of unpopular opinion, inherent in the latter standard. See
notes 145-56 supra. An absolute privilege is not employed because, as Justice Brennan notes:
"Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the
right to free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published..
• should enjoy a like immunity. At the time the First Amendment was adopted, as today,
there were those unscrupulous enough and skillful enough to use the deliberate or reckless
falsehood as an effective tool to unseat the public servant or even topple an
administration. That speech is used as a tool for political ends does not automatically
bring it under the protective mantle of the Constitution. For the use of the known lie as a
tool is at once at odds with the premises of democratic government and with the orderly
manner in which economic, social, or political change is to be effected. Calculated
falsehood, (along with reckless falsehood) falls into that class of utterances which are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality."
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942). Moreover, the substantial body of case law (see notes 52-67 supra) surrounding the actual
malice standard facilitates easy implementation. For the views of the absolutists on the Court, however, see J. Black, concurring, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964); J.
Goldberg, conccurring, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254-97 (1964); J. Douglas,
concurring, in Garrison v. Lluisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 80 (1964); opinion of J. Black in Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170 (1967). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279
(1964) for a statement adducing the value of false statements in free debate.
148. For substantiation, for the view that the First Amendment was intended to apply to all
matters relating to self-government, see Meikeljohn, supra note 9; Bloustein, supra note 8; Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I (1971); Steel, Freedom
To Hear: A Political Justification of 7he First Amendment, 46 WASH. L. REV. 311 (1971).
149. Some matters of political importance are discussion of pending legislation, commentary
on the functioning of governmental bodies, commentary on institutions, companies, and individuals
in their relation to government, plans for reform of government, and speech relating to the official
conduct of public officials. Since the public activities of public officials are almost invariably of
substantial importance to the body politic, there seems little sense in differentiating between the
public concern standard and the standard developed in Times and its progeny. Matters of social
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"Public concern" is differentiated from mere "public interest." A public
interest test 50 may protect issues of which the public has a curiosity about
or a "lurid thirst for details;" the public concern test protects only those issues of
governing importance. So, while a socialite's divorce may be a matter of public
5
interest, it is not a matter of public concern.1 '
The determination of what constitutes public concern is made by the courts in
the interest of the people. Such a task seems neither inherently inappropriate nor
inordinately difficult. Though the Gertz Court questioned the wisdom of having
state and federal court judges decide "what information is relevant to selfgovernment,"' 52 under the Gertz test, subject matter analysis also occurs in the
guise of determining whether an issue is a "public controversy" and the defamed
53
individual a public figure.
In contrast to the public figure tests, the public concern test seems to place
emphasis on the most pertinent factor in the assignment of constitutional
protection, the nature of the issue. It is the nature of the issue, not the status of
the defamed which, in general, relates to the public's right to know. 54 For example, in Gertz, would the allegations of a conspiracy to discredit the police
have been any less important if Gertz had occupied a less prominent place in
society? One of the defects of public figure standards is that they fail to recognize
importance are those matters which though not explicitly political, may have a significant effect upon
people's lives. Some such matters would be allegations of a fix in a nationally important football
game (Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the turbulent activities at a college campus
surrounding the enrollment of the first black student at the school (Associated Press v. Walker, 388
U.S. 130 (1967), and allegations of a nationwide conspiracy to discredit the police, Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The truth or falsity of the statements contained in such articles is
not the factor which determines whether constitutional protection should be given. The crucial
factor is the nature of the issue discussed. So, while the statements in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 329 (197 1) may have been truer than the statements in the other articles, the issue involved, the tribulations of a minor distributor of pornographic material, seems not to be a matter of
social or political importance.
150. For the most notable justification and exposition of the public interest test, see Justice
Brennan's plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
151. The Florida Supreme Court applying the public concern test and finding Mrs. Firestone's
activities not to be of public concern, conceived its task as that of differentiating between "mere
curiosity or the undeniably prevalent morbid or prurient intrigue with scandal, or with the potentially humorous misfortune of others, on the one hand and real or general concern on the other"
Firstone v. Time, Inc., Fla., 271 So. 2d 745, 748(1972). See also Bloustein supra note 8 discussing the
difference between "public interest meaning curiosity and "public interest" meaning "value of the
public of receiving information of governing importance." Bloustein, supra note 8, at 56-57. The
concern of this paper is obviously with the latter.
152. J. Marshall, dissenting, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 79 (197 1) citedin Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 325, 346 (1974). See Comment, Defanation: 'Real' Public ConcernA 'More Apt' Test For Constitutional Privilege," 26 FLA. L. REV. 131 (1973).
153. See J. Marshall, dissenting, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 488-89 (1976).
154. Justice Brennan states: "The public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the
conduct of the participant and on the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971).
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the importance of society acquiring information about all of its members. 155
56
As the Court stated in Thornhill v. Alabama,1
Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this
nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or
appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period.157
Ideas of reputational differences between public and private people should
not condition the flow of information to the body politic. 5 8 First, it is a dubious
assumption that public people can invariably counter defamatory statements
better than private people can. The strength of the denial or explanation seems
to be the factor upon which the ability to assuage the effects of defamatory statements depends, not the defamed's previous notoriety or anonymity. 59
Another dubious idea upon which public figure standards are based
is the idea that some individuals have voluntarily assumed a risk of injury to
reputation by their general prominence in society or participation in a particular
issue. Such an idea runs counter to the democratic ideal of encouraging participation in the vital affairs of the day. As one commentator notes:
There is an underlying premise in Gertz that merely by being successful
in life's endeavors or by participating in public or civic affairs, one
loses the substantial protection retained by those who shrink from the
spotlight or engage in more mundane pursuits.' 60
And equally objectionable under Gertz is the idea that some substantial constitutional interest is served by protecting unbridled incursion into the private
155. Many situations can be envisiaged in which the public's "right to know" is violated if commentary on the activities of private people involved in matters of public concern is not protected
by the actual malice standard. For example, if a reporter discovered a "payola" scheme between a
public official and a private citizen, the public's "right to know" is abridged if only the reporter's
comments about the public official's involvement are protected by the actual malice standard. The
public's "right to know" would also be abridged if in an investigation of a price-fixing scheme
among a number of corporations, only the statements pertaining to the activities of the public figures
involved were protected by the actual malice standard. In both examples, and in many other situations, the inquiry into personal status detracts from the real issues at hand, and limits the public's
right to know without compelling justification.
156. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
157. Id. at 102.
158. See also notes 104-09 supra, for the Gertz court's concepts of reputational differences between public and private people. For a sharp criticism of the idea of reputational differences, see
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 46 (1971). And for the idea that sometimes public people
may have a greater stake in their reputations than private people, see Vindication, supra note 12, at
1737.
159. See also notes 95-96 supra.
160. Frakt, supra note 110, at 487. Frakt also raises the idea that varying judicial remedies according to status may be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection
for all citizens.
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affairs of those unfortunate people considered to be all-purpose public
1 61
figures.
The other difficulty with the Gertz public figure standard, as stated previously, is its lack of clarity and complexity. Applying the Gertz two-tier public
figure test is no easy task, even for the most knowledgeable judge and jury.' 6'
Applying the test, when combined with the task of untangling the Gertz fault and
163
liability requirements, seems an almost insurmountable task for a court.
Uneven results and subsequent self-censorship by the press can be the only result
of such an ambiguous standard.
In contrast, the public concern test reveals its utility in its clarity. A court
using the public concern test has only to ascertain the nature of the pertinent
issue to determine the applicable standard of liability. The costs of the litigation
and the probability of appeal are reduced with the decrease in the number of
legal issues involved. Moreover, when the lawful zone is clear, wide, and wellprotected, publishers can publish controversial or unverifiable information
without undue fear of subsequent punishment.' 64 And plaintiffs, public and
private, can ascertain under what circumstances legal remedies exist for injury
to their reputations. It is clear that in the area of public libel "some degree of
certainty is at least as valuable a part of justice as perfection." 65 If only the
current Court would realize such.
161. The Gertz rules may "easily produce the paradoxical result of dampening discussion of issues
of public or general concern because they happen to involve private citizens while extending
constitutional encouragement to discussion of aspects of the lives of 'public figures' that are not in the
area of public or general concern" Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971). And as E.
Bloustein points out, an appropriate standard of liability is one which will "assure the robust exposition of public issues without inviting the lurid exploitation of private lives" Bloustein, supra note 8
at 95.
162. See notes 132-33 supra.
163. One author gives a not all encompassing list of twenty-three issues that a Court must accurately resolve in order to determine liability in a given post-Gertz libel case. See Keeton,
Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1221, 1223-24 (1976).
164. See Anderson, supra note 36; and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 52-53 (197 1), explaining why Gertz induces self-censorship by its unclarity and lack of comprehensive protection.
165. Cassell & Co. v. Broome, A.C. 1027, 1054 (1972) cited in Keeton, Defamation and Freedom
of the Press, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1221, 1225 (1976).
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